Public reporting burden for the collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to a penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number.
CLAUSEWITZ AND THE THEORY OF LIMITED WAR
Clausewitz's theoretical writing was based on the idea that understanding the nature of war required understanding the interaction between non-quantifiable moral factors and a physical environment characterized by uncertainty and violence. 1 Clausewitz argued that, in theory, both the political aims and military means to achieve them would spiral towards the extreme use of force. However, having studied both the wars of Frederick the Great and Napoleon, Clausewitz saw that this did not match reality. Thus, one of his fundamental arguments was that there were two distinct types of wars with different war aims. While some wars would end with the overthrow the enemy, others would end through bargaining and peace negotiations. In 1 Michael Howard, Clausewitz, (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1983) 34. reality there was a spectrum of war from total wars of extermination to simple armed observations.
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To explain this disparity, Clausewitz noted that his theoretical notion of absolute war required a genuine polarity between the political aims of each belligerent. One side's loss would be a zero-sum gain for the other. However, war was a gamble in which each side placed different values and probabilities on the potential outcomes, and one side's gain could result in a disproportionate loss to the other. Also, neither side could know with certainty how strongly the other might resist. This meant that war would always stop short of the theoretical maximum.
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Clausewitz synthesized his thinking by saying that war "is controlled by its political object," and that "the value of this object must determine the sacrifices to be made for it in magnitude and also in duration." Thus, "the desire for peace on either side will rise and fall with the probability of further success and the amount of effort these would require." The grounds for peace short of total conquest could be found in circumstances where victory was improbable or unacceptably costly for one of the belligerents. ALLIED FORCE. Finally, Gen Ralston, Vice Chairman of the JCS, even wanted to withhold the B-2 from the operation for fear one might be shot down.
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Although NATO had the capability to annihilate the FRY, limited political commitment and the overriding priority given to negative objectives resulted in an extremely constrained use of military force. Only U.S. and NATO air power was used, because only air power provided the capability to strike with precision and limit both losses and collateral damage. Not only were ground forces specifically excluded by President Clinton during his speech on 24 March, but also the U.S. sent its aircraft carrier in the Mediterranean to the Persian Gulf before air strikes began, and had only 1/3 of the total aircraft in place that it would eventually use to win the war.
Perhaps the most visible constraints were the limits placed on initial strikes. There were only a handful of the targets approved, and they were not the ones that Gen Short, the air component commander, thought would be necessary to bring the conflict to a quick termination.
Nobody in Washington, or in most NATO countries, was willing to authorize what Gen Short thought was the right use of military power, a short but intense air campaign directed at the FRY leadership in Belgrade.
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The NATO strategy was also influenced by a fundamental miscalculation in the strategic net assessment of war aims. The primary error was the prevailing assumption that a short, limited bombing campaign would be enough to get Milosevic to agree to negotiate a solution to the crisis. The assessment among some political leaders, such as Secretary of State Albright, was that Milosevic would cave-in easily, and this would be a short war lasting only 3-4 days. Kosovo where all its people can live in security and enjoy universal human rights and freedom on an equal basis." 22 Finally, they restated the five conditions for the termination of the conflict and emphasized that there would be no compromise on this position.
A NATO spokesman emphasized NATO's determination and resolve in a press conference on 23 April, and also revealed that the conduct of the war was changing. NATO was determined to strike at the central nervous system of the FRY, exactly the approach Gen Short Daalder and O'Hanlon, [200] [201] [202] [203] [204] Hosmer, Posen, 39. 25 Daalder and O'Hanlon, [192] [193] [194] [195] [196] [197] [198] constraints on the use of military force were essential to limit opposition in countries like Italy Whether or not the ethnic Serb population would have gone into the "Serb Heroic mode" based on more intense bombing or a more direct threat of a ground invasion is a matter of speculation. However, this discussion reinforces the point that every action in a limited war affects the enemy's war aims and emotional attachment to them, and can fundamentally change the outcome of the war regardless of the tactical outcome.
CONCLUSION
This brief analysis is not meant to imply that the leaders involved in this conflict were inept or stupid. Certainly the intellectual effort to devise strategies for ALLIED FORCE may have 26 Hosmer, [124] [125] [126] [127] [128] [129] [130] been more difficult than the physical effort to fight it, and some amount of miscalculation was Primarily by highlighting the critical interaction of moral and physical factors in war and the fundamental role of human judgment. Thus, if sweat in training can reduce blood on the battlefield, then the detailed study of limited war and coercive diplomacy should better prepare the future strategist. And although Clausewitz's ideas about limited war may be somewhat incomplete, they can guide the professional military officer in this endeavor. Perhaps
Clausewitz's hit the mark exactly as intended. After all, his primary goal in writing On War was not to provide a checklist for the future strategist, but to guide future military leaders through a life-long process of studying the entire spectrum of war.
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